LONDON, Oct. 23 -- The government of the United Kingdom issued the following news:
The extentof the UK coastline and remoteness ofsome of the locations where small vessels canarrive createsmyriad opportunities forwould-besmugglers of goods and peopleandthisposesamajorlogistical challenge for Border Force,whichwill onlyincreaseas its resourcesare squeezedas a result ofgovernment spending decisions.
Whentheinspection of general maritime(GM)began, theoutcome of the 2025 Spending Reviewwasnotyetknown. However, Border Force had accepted that its funding would be cut. Against this backdrop, rather than repeat recommendations that relied on substantial investment and long-term programmes,it wasagreed with the Director General Border Force to focus on what could be achieved in the short-term (18-24 months) within existing resources, including through efficiencies, reorganisation, and reprioritisation.
Nonetheless, it is important torecordthattheBorder Force Maritime Command (BFMC) has the only UK law enforcement maritime assets capable of operating beyond the UK's territorial watersandthe age of the fleet means that a programme of significant maintenance and life extension work is required to keep it sea-worthy. Thisimpactsvessels' availability for operational activity. A Maritime Capability Replacement Programme (MCRP) began in 2021, but as at 2024-25 the fleet was not due to be replaced until 2029 at the earliest.At the time of writing,itremainedunclear what effect, if any, theoutcome of theSpendingReview would have on the MCRP timetable.
Equally, an effective response to GMthreatsreliesnot just on improvements and enhanced capabilities within Border Force buton substantialinputsfrom others, in particular the Ministry of Defence and UK policing. A wider review of maritime security, intended to developa whole systemresponse to threats across all government departments and agencies, was completed in August 2024.This did not form part of the inspection, howeverinspectors understood thatofficials wereawaitingclarity on future fundingbeforedeciding how to take forwarditsrecommendations.
The inspectoratefirstreportedon GM in 2015. Atthattime,Border Force's coverage of GM was poor by comparison with its coverage of general aviation (GA), whichBorder Forceacknowledged. Ten years on,it was thereforedisappointingthat GM continued to feel like a 'poor relation'.
The appointment of a Maritime Director in early 2025 is a step in the right direction, provided he is empowered and supported.
As apriority,Border Forceneeds to improve its knowledge base. It is hard to see how Border Force and partner agencies can create an effective strategy and operational response to GM threats withouthavinga comprehensive picture of the locations around the UK where GM vessels can arrive, yet efforts to document this have been half-hearted to date. Similarly, there needs to be an overhaul of record-keeping in relation to GM-related activity by Border Force staff and Field Intelligence Officers, and of the evaluation of operational deployments by BFMC, in order to create and maintain an informed picture of GM threats, trends, actions,and outcomes that is capable of supporting operational and strategic decision-making regarding priorities, deployments, resourcing, and investments.
There is also a pressing need for Border Force to take stock ofits human capital in relation to its maritime responsibilities.The maritime environment can be harsh and hazardous, especially at sea, and Border Force staffoperatingin this environment need to have the skills and experience to do so safely. This inspection again found that provision of training was not aligned with either individual or business needs, and that there was little if any evidence of succession planning. This was a particular problem for BFMC, where some roles are highly skilled and require professional qualifications that take years toacquire.
Along withnine recommendationsrequiringpositive action,the report alsorecommendsthat the Home Office should resisttaking actionin two areas - the mandating of GM activity and of the 'submit a Pleasure Craft Report' (sPCR) system-without further detailed consideration and resource planning. To do so now would not improve Border Force's overall efficiency and effectiveness and would be unlikely toimpactthe more serious threats posed by GM.
This report was sent to the Home Secretary on11 June 2025.
The above represents the views of my predecessor as ICIBI, David Bolt, under whose leadership and direction this inspection was conducted.
John Tuckett, Independent Chief Inspector ofBordersand Immigration
23October2025
*
An inspection of General Maritime (October 2024 - February 2025))
* The Home Office responses to the Chief Inspector's reports
Disclaimer: Curated by HT Syndication.
